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Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy carry a pessimistic belief 
in historical persistence: that is, they believe that Latin America has always had very high 
levels of income and wealth inequality, suggesting it will be hard, or even impossible, for 
modern social policy to create a more egalitarian society. This paper argues that this 
conclusion is not supported by what little evidence we have. The persistence view is 
based on an historical literature which has made little or no effort to be comparative. 
Indeed, other studies have shown that even where there is measured historical 
persistence, the effects decay over time (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Nunn 2008; Bruhn and 
Gallego 2009). Yet modern analysts see a more unequal Latin America compared with 
Asia and the rich post-industrial nations (López and Perry 2008) and then assume that 
this must always have been true. Indeed, some have argued that high inequality appeared 
very early in the post-conquest Americas, and that this fact supported rent-seeking and 
anti-growth institutions which help explain the disappointing growth performance we 
observe there even today. This paper argues to the contrary. Compared with the rest of 
the world, inequality was not high in pre-conquest 1491, nor was it high in the post-
conquest decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the mid-19
th century 
just prior Latin America’s belle époque. It only became high thereafter. Historical 
persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth. 
The next section places Latin American pre-industrial inequality in context by 
comparing it with inequality the world around over the two millennia from Rome in 14 
AD to British India in 1947. It turns out that there is little that is unusual about pre-  4
industrial Latin America when that comparison is made. The paper then offers empirical 
explanations for pre-industrial inequality the world around over the two millennia since 
Rome, including late 18
th and 19
th century Latin America. Next, we ask whether Latin 
America has always been more unequal. The paper goes on to use the estimated 
relationship found in the pre-industrial sample to fill by prediction the many and big 
empirical gaps in Latin American inequality history from 1491 through the end of the 
belle époque. That is, it uses an estimated world pre-industrial relationship to predict 
Latin American inequality where no income distribution evidence is yet available. These 
predictions are then compared with the Latin American inequality facts where they exist. 
The paper concludes by posing four revisionist hypotheses. The hope is that these 
working hypotheses will be used to motivate the collection of new pre-industrial 
inequality evidence and thus perhaps to overthrow once and for all the historical 
persistence view that pervades modern debate about Latin American inequality.  
 
Latin America in Context: 
What Did Pre-Industrial Inequality Look Like the World Round?
1 
  
We have no evidence documenting inequality for the Inca, Aztec or other 
indigenous civilizations in the Americas prior to the arrival of the Iberian conquerors. But 
we can guess. Recently, Branko Milanovic, Peter Lindert and myself (2008; hereafter 
BMW) collected what we call an ‘ancient inequality’ data base for 29 places, ranging 
over two millennia from the Roman Empire in the year 14, Byzantium in the year 1000, 
England in 1290, Tuscany in 1427, Holland in 1732, Old Castille in 1752, France in 
1788, Java in 1880, and British India in 1947. The sample includes four Latin American 
                                                 
1 As will be apparent, this and the next section draw heavily on Milanovic et al. (2008).   5
observations: Nueva España 1790, Chile 1861, Brazil 1872, and Peru 1876, although a 
new Mexican 1844 social table observation can now be added to the BMW sample. 
While each of these 29 BMW observations reports a Gini coefficient and other measures 
of inequality, only Tuscany 1427 offers a full size distribution of income. Instead, the 
observations have been constructed mainly from what are called social tables, sources 
which report average income and income recipients by social classes, but no income 
variance within them.  
Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies where classes 
were clearly delineated, where the differences in mean incomes between them were 
substantial, and where mobility between them was trivial. If class (and race) alone 
determined one’s income, and if income differences between classes were large while 
income differences within classes were small (mainly reflecting life-cycle status and 
luck), then most inequality would be explained by average income differences between 
classes. One of the most famous social tables was constructed by Gregory King for 
England and Wales in 1688 (Barnett 1936; Lindert and Williamson 1982). King’s class 
list was fairly detailed (31 in number), but he did not report inequalities within these 
social groups, so we cannot identify within-class inequality for 1688 England. Yet, when 
income variance within class is also available for any pre-industrial country offering 
social table estimates, the differences between measured inequality are typically very 
small whether within class variance is included or excluded. Indeed, when comparing any 
two pre-industrial societies where full size distributions are available, inequality 
differences between them can be explained almost entirely by inequality differences 
measured by class differences alone. In short, the lion’s share of inequality in pre-  6
industrial societies is and was accounted for by between-class average income 
differences.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 report what these BMW data look like. The Gini estimates 
are plotted in Figure 1 against income or GDP (or GDI) per capita. Figure 1 also displays 
what we call the inequality possibility frontier (solid line), a curve based on the 
maximum inequality the elite could have extracted at that income per capita. The 
maximum is constructed under the assumption that everybody but the elite in such 
repressive societies would have gotten just the World Bank’s subsistence minimum of 
$PPP 300.
2 The ratio of the actual inequality to the maximum feasible inequality (both 
expressed in Gini coefficients) is called the extraction ratio.
3 In most cases, the 
calculated pre-industrial Ginis lie pretty close to the inequality possibility frontier (IPF). 
The countries farthest below the IPF curve – with the lowest extraction ratios -- are the 
most advanced pre-industrial economies in northwestern Europe: that is, 1561-1808 
Holland, 1788 France, and 1688-1801 England.  
The inequality possibility frontier allows us to better situate these ancient pre-
industrial inequality estimates in a modern context. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides 
estimates of inequality extraction ratios for 25 contemporary societies. Brazil has often 
                                                 
2 This is less than Maddison’s (1998: 12) assumed subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 which, in principle, 
covers more than physiological needs. Note that a purely physiological minimum “sufficient to sustain life 
with moderate activity and zero consumption of other goods” (Bairoch 1993: 106) was estimated by 
Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices, or $PPP 355 at 1990 prices. Our minimum is also consistent with the 
World Bank absolute poverty line which is 1.08 per day per capita in 1993 $PPP (Chen and Ravallion 
2007: 6). This works out to be about $PPP 365 per annum in 1990 international prices. Since more than a 
billion people are believed to have incomes less than the World Bank global poverty line, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the physiological minimum income must be less. One may recall also that Colin 
Clark (1957: 18-23) distinguished between international units (the early PPP dollar) and oriental units, the 
lower dollar equivalents which he thought held for subtropical or tropical regions where calorie, housing 
and clothing needs are considerably less than those in temperate climates. Since our ancient pre-industrial 
sample includes a fair number of tropical countries, this gives us another reason to use a conservatively low 
estimate of the physiological minimum. 
3 The extraction ratio is not unlike an index of the percent in poverty, but where the poverty line is fixed.   7
been cited as an example of an extremely unequal society, driven by a long history of 
slavery, racial discrimination and regional dualism. Indeed, Brazil’s Gini in 2002 is 
comparable to the most unequal pre-industrial societies in our ancient inequality sample. 
But Brazil is more than four times richer than the average ancient society in our sample, 
so its maximum feasible inequality (92.7) is much higher than our ancient society average 
(60.6). Thus, modern elites have extracted only a little more than 63 percent of the 
maximum feasible inequality in Brazil, and its inequality extraction ratio is about the 
same as what we find among the least exploitative and repressive ancient societies like 
1801-3 England and 1886 Japan. What is true of Brazil, is also true of contemporary 
Chile, Mexico and Peru. All three have Ginis today well above the world average (Chile 
2003 = 54.6, Mexico 2000 = 53.8 and Peru 2002 = 52 versus the world average = 40.6), 
but all three have extraction ratios below the least exploitative in our ancient societies 
sample. Furthermore, not all of these four have Ginis today above what they were 150-
200 years ago. Inequality has fallen over two centuries in two Latin American republics 
for which data exist: Chile 1861 = 63.7 to 2003 = 54.6, or 14 percent lower, and Mexico 
1790 = 63.5 to 2000 = 53.8, or 15 percent lower. Inequality has been on the rise over two 
centuries in the other two Latin American republics for which data exist: Brazil 1872 = 
43.3 to 2002 = 58.8, or 36 percent higher; and Peru 1876 = 42.2 to 2002 = 52, or 23 
percent higher.  
As a country becomes richer, and its surplus above subsistence rises, its feasible 
inequality expands. Consequently, even if recorded inequality is stable, the extraction 
ratio must fall. This can be seen in Figure 2 where the inequality extraction ratio is 
plotted against income per capita for both ancient societies and their modern   8
counterparts. Thus, the social consequences of increased inequality may not entail as 
much relative impoverishment, or as much perceived injustice, as might appear if we 
looked only at the recorded Gini. This logic is particularly compelling for low and 
middle-income societies where increases in income push the maximum feasible 
inequality up sharply along the steepest part of the IPF curve. The farther a society rises 
above the subsistence minimum, the less will economic development lift its inequality 
possibilities, and thus the extraction ratio will be driven more and more by the rise in the 
actual Gini itself. Thus, the inequality extraction ratio has fallen everywhere in Latin 
America over the past century or two, and in some cases by a lot: it has fallen by 15 
percent in Brazil (from 74.2 in 1872 to 63.4 in 2002), by 32 percent in Chile (from 83 in 
1861 to 56.4 in 2003), by 47 percent in Mexico (from 105.5 in 1790 to 56.2 in 2000), and 
by 27 percent in Peru (from 78.1 in 1876 to 56.7 in 2002). While the rest of this paper 
will focus on actual or measured inequality, future debates over social justice and 
economic development will have to struggle with the implications of different trends in 
actual inequality and extraction ratios. 
 
Fundamentals: Explaining Pre-Industrial Inequality the World Round 
  
Using this BMW information from ancient pre-industrial societies, can we explain 
differences in observed inequality? The Kuznets hypothesis posits that inequality tends to 
follow a bell-shape as average real income increases. Although Kuznets formulated his 
hypothesis explicitly with a view toward industrializing and industrialized economies, 
one might wonder whether his Curve is even more apparent among our pre-industrial   9
economies as well. After all, the secular upswing could be easily explained by increases 
in per capita income: poor countries do not have much surplus for the elite to extract, but 
as income rises in pre-industrial economies, so does the surplus and potential inequality. 
In addition to log average income and its square, Table 2 includes the urbanization rate, 
population density and colonial status (a dummy variable). The regression also includes a 
number of controls for country-specific eccentricities in the data: the number of social 
groups available for calculating the Gini, whether the social table is based on tax data, 
and whether the social table for a colony includes the income of resident colonists. The 
Kuznets hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on average income (or its log) and 
negative coefficient on its square. We also expect higher inequality for the more 
urbanized countries (reflecting a common finding that inequality in urban areas tends to 
be higher than in rural areas: Ravallion et al. 2007), and for those that are ruled by 
foreign elites since powerful colonizers are presumed to be able to achieve higher 
extraction rates than weaker local elites, and since countries with weak local elites but 
with large surpluses will attract powerful colonizers to extract it (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001, 2002). 
  The empirical results confirm all expectations. Both income terms are of the right 
sign and significant, supporting a pre-industrial Kuznets Curve.
4 The sign on the 
urbanization rate is, as predicted, positive, but since it competes with population density, 
its statistical significance is somewhat lower. Still, each percentage point increase in the 
urbanization rate (say, from 10 percent to 11 percent) is associated with an increase in the 
Gini by 0.35 points. Colonies were clearly much more unequal: holding everything else 
                                                 
4 Note that GDP per capita is in natural logs.   10
constant, colonies had a Gini almost 13 points higher than non-colonies.
5 Foreigner is a 
dummy variable that controls for two observations (South Serbia 1455 and Levant 1596) 
that were colonies but where their ancient inequality surveys did not report the incomes 
and numbers of colonizers at the top. This is therefore simply another control for data 
eccentricity, and its negative sign shows that being a colony, but not having colonizers 
included in the survey, reduces recorded inequality considerably (9 to 10 points).  
The number of social groups used in the inequality calculations, or tax census 
origin of social tables, do not affect the Gini in any significant way. This finding is 
comforting, especially regarding Nueva España’s three classes, because it shows that our 
estimates of inequality are being driven by fundamentals, not by the way the social tables 
were constructed by pre-industrial observers.  
  Population density is negatively associated with inequality, although its 
significance weakens when the two Java observations – the most dense part of the pre-
industrial world – are removed. It might have been expected that the introduction of a 
dummy variable for more densely populated Asia would have caused the effect of density 
to dissipate. This is not the case, as shown in column 2 of Table 2. The negative impact 
of population density on inequality seems to be counter-intuitive. After all, conventional 
theory – which we will exploit below -- would predict that more population pressure on 
the land should raise land yields and rents, lower labor’s marginal product and the wage, 
thus producing more inequality, not less. Furthermore, this effect should have been all the 
more powerful in pre-industrial societies where land and labor drove inequality not, as in 
modern societies, human capital and financial wealth. It seems likely that this 
                                                 
5 To repeat, it should be stressed that this is a correlation only. The causal relation cannot be identified with 
this regression.   11
conventional effect is being offset in the ancient economy data by two forces. First, 
densely populated agrarian societies also had lower per capita income, so this may have 
been working against the conventional force (since inequality rises with per capita 
income). Second, more densely populated agrarian societies must have had higher 
relative food prices than thinly settled societies, so that nominal subsistence had to be 
much higher to purchase the more expensive foodstuffs, lowering measured inequality 
and the extraction ratio.
6 It seems likely that this force must have been most powerful 
during the two millennia before the middle of the 19
th century since a world market for 
grains did not yet exist and thus local conditions dictated the relative price of food 
(Latham and Neal 1983; Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008; Studer 2008). This second 
offset has important implications for comparing inequality in the labor-scarce and 
resource-abundant Americas with the labor-abundant and resource-scarce Europe, and 
between the densely populated highlands in Mexico and the Andes relative to resource- 
abundant Southern Cone. However, it is less clear that it had the same effect within 
countries over time, since the results in Table 2 rely almost entirely on a cross section, not 
a time series. Finally, to the extent that population size and density are correlated, there is 
a third possible offset. Looking at modern data, Filipe Campante and Quoc-Anh Do 
(2007) explain the negative correlation by the size of the potential revolutionary 
underclass concentrated around the capital thus posing a threat to the elite.  
                                                 
6 Rarely do even modern inequality studies assess the impact of different class-specific cost-of-living trends 
on real inequality trends. We know this mattered hugely in early modern Europe (Hoffman et al. 2002), 
and we need to know whether it has also mattered at any time in Latin America since 1491. When Latin 
America underwent her commodity export boom during the belle époque, did the rise in food export prices 
in the Southern Cone serve to raise real inequality even more than nominal inequality? Did it have the 
opposite effect in Mexico, which imported cheap corn from the United States? And what about 20
th century 
Latin American food exporters when their terms of trade collapsed 1915-1940?    12
  The stylized picture that emerges is this: Inequality follows contours that are 
consistent with the Kuznets Curve hypothesis, a pre-industrial secular rise to a peak, 
followed by a fall during modern economic growth. It follows that most of the pre-
industrial Third World had probably reached very high levels of inequality by the early 
19
th century before what is called the first global trade boom. However, the extraction 
ratio tends to fall as income increases, even during pre-industrial times. This fact would, 
of course, invite a European colonist to plunder where the potential surplus was big, but 
where the local elite had relaxed their extraction rate. We will return to this issue below. 
  
Has Latin America Always Been More Unequal? 
 
Has Latin America always been more unequal than other parts of the world, as 
implied by the recent work of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997; 
Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff 2000)? Engerman and Sokoloff offered a hypothesis to 
account for Latin American growth underachievement during the two centuries following 
its independence. Their thesis begins with the plausible assertion that high levels of 
income inequality, and thus of political power, favor rich landlords and rent-seekers, and 
thus the development of institutions which are compatible with rent-seeking but 
incompatible with economic growth. Their thesis argues further that high levels of Latin 
American inequality have their roots in the natural resource endowments present when 
Iberia conquered and colonized the region five centuries ago. Exploitation of the native 
population and of imported African slaves, as well as their subsequent 
disenfranchisement, reinforced the development of institutions incompatible with growth.   13
Engerman and Sokoloff had no difficulty collecting evidence which confirmed high 
inequality, disenfranchisement and lack of suffrage in Latin America compared with the 
United States. But what about comparisons with the rest of the world, and what about 
earlier?
7 Oddly enough, neither the Engerman-Sokoloff team or its critics have 
confronted the thesis with inequality evidence for the economic leaders in northwest 
Europe at comparable pre-industrial stages; this is the comparison that matters, not with 
industrial United States.  
Table 3 presents inequality information for pre-industrial western Europe (that is, 
prior to 1810) and for pre-industrial Latin America (that is, prior to 1880). For the former, 
we have observations from 1788 France, 1561 and 1732 Holland, and 1688, 1759 and 
1801 England-Wales. For the latter, we have Nueva España 1790 and Mexico 1844 taken 
as an average, Chile 1861, Brazil 1872 and Peru 1876. Engerman and Sokoloff coined 
their hypothesis in terms of actual inequality. According to that criterion, their thesis 
must be soundly rejected. That is, the (population weighted) average Latin American Gini 
(47.5) was considerably lower than that of western Europe (52.9), not higher.
8 
Furthermore, the comparative inequality implications emerging for these social tables 
have been confirmed recently by Rafael Dobado and Hector Gracia using an inequality 
proxy – Maddison’s real GDP per capita relative to their unskilled grain wage: according 
to their data, in 1820 Mexico, Bolivia and Colombia all had less inequality than did the 
                                                 
7 John Coatsworth argues that the Engerman-Sokoloff thesis has not held up well to scrutiny: “what little 
quantitative evidence there is does not suggest that ownership of land, or other assets for that matter, was 
more concentrated in Latin America than in the United States” (Coatsworth 2008: 553). However, 
Coatsworth’s survey of the land and wealth distribution estimates for Latin America (Coatsworth 2008: 
Table 2, 553) reveals that the first Latin America observations are for the province of Buenos Aires in 1820 
and 1838, and for Rio de Janeiro in 1830. He is not able to report any colonial observations. See also 
Johnson and Frank (2006) and Gelman and Santilli (2006). 
 
8 If pre-industrial Mexican inequality is described best by the 1844 observation in Table 3, then this 
conclusion can be made even stronger.    14
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, or even Portugal and Spain (Dobado and 
Garcia 2009: Figure 18). 
It is not true that pre-industrial Latin America was more unequal than pre-
industrial northwest Europe.
9 Thus, if inequality encouraged rent-seeking and 
discouraged growth in Latin America, it did it even more so in northwest Europe where 
the industrial revolution first started! Since we know that high inequality was consistent 
with industrial revolutions occurring in western Europe, it is unclear why it should be 
inconsistent with it in Latin America somewhat later. However, Latin America was 
poorer than northwest Europe, and poorer societies have a smaller surplus for the elite to 
extract. Thus, maximum feasible inequality was considerably lower and extraction rates 
were considerably higher in Latin America than in northwest Europe (Table 3). While 
measured inequality does not support the Engerman-Sokoloff thesis, the extraction rate 
does.
10 The Engerman-Sokoloff team, their followers, and their critics all need to decide 
which of these inequality indicators matters for their hypothesis and why. To the extent 
that political power determines the extraction ratio, then Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson may be quite right in stressing political inequality rather than just economic 




                                                 
9 See also the summaries on this point in Bértola et al. (2009: 5-6) and Bértola (2009). It should be added 
that has Asia not always been less unequal? Ancient Asia was not significantly less unequal when we 
control for other factors. Indeed, population density is sufficient to identify why ancient Asia had lower 
levels of inequality than the rest of the pre-industrial world.  
10 In this sense, Coatsworth may have been too quick to conclude, based on measured inequality, that “if 
colonial institutions constrained economic development, they did not do so until after the colonial era” 
(Coatsworth 2008: 11).   15
Broad Sweep: Reconstructing Latin American Inequality Trends since 1491 
 
Initial Conditions: What Was Latin American Inequality Like in 1491? 
  Table 4 and Figure 3 use the Gini regression equation (1) in Table 2 and estimates 
of the dependent variables also reported in Table 4 to predict Ginis for Latin America in 
1491 before the arrival of the Iberians, shortly after the conquest (call it 1492), 1600, 
1700, 1790, 1820 and 1870. Table 4 also predicts Ginis for Mexico in 1820 and 1870. In 
addition, the table reports predictions for the five Latin American cases where we also 
have actual inequality estimates: i.e. Nueva España 1790, Mexico 1844, Brazil 1872, 
Chile 1861 and Peru 1876. While the correlation between actual and predicted inequality 
for those five cases is hardly perfect, it is positive and strongly significant (R
2=0.68), a 
comforting result.  
Table 4 implies that the Gini coefficient in Latin America prior to the arrival of 
the Iberians was 22.5, which would have made it the society with the lowest inequality in 
the pre-industrial world (or at least in our sample of it: Table 1). China in 1880 had a Gini 
of 24.5, very close to pre-conquest Latin America. Dutch colonial Java had a Gini in 
1880 of 39.7, a figure which would have been 27.1 without the Dutch colonists 
(according to the BMW regression, 39.7-12.6 = 27.1). Thus, Table 4 implies that pre-
conquest Latin America had modest levels of inequality much like all the other poor pre-
industrial societies in our sample which had escaped being colonized.  
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Extracting the Surplus: What Was the Colonial Impact Like after 1492?  
  Given what we know about ancient pre-industrial economies the world around, 
and assuming that Iberian colonists were no better or worse at extracting surplus than 
were the other colonizers in the ancient inequality sample (England, Holland, and the 
Ottoman Turks), the answer to this question is quite simple. Colonies had higher Gini 
coefficients by 12-13 percentage points (Table 2), so the Latin American Gini coefficient 
might have drifted up from 22.5 in 1491 to something like 35 in the post-1492 decades. 
Perhaps it was in fact a bit lower or a bit higher, but inequality clearly must have jumped 
up significantly during the first decades after the Iberian conquest, an increase of about 
half. Not only did the Iberian elite replace the indigenous elite, but, if they were anything 
like the English, the Dutch and the Turks, the Iberians must have been able (or willing) to 
raise the extraction rate in their favor by a lot.  
 
Inequality Decline? The Likely Impact of the 16
th Century Demographic Disaster 
As is well known, European disease caused immense demographic damage to the 
indigenous population over the century following Columbus’s first voyage, due to 
soaring mortality rates. Massimo Livi-Bacci thinks it shrank by more than 90 percent by 
the early 17
th century (Livi Bacci 2006). Other scholars, like Angus Maddison, think the 
shrinking was smaller, and Table 4 uses Maddison to take the lower bound. The Atlantic 
slave trade tried to substitute African slaves for decimated indigenous populations but 
their addition was far smaller than the subtraction from the indigenous population caused 
by European disease. Furthermore, the African slaves arrived in significant numbers only 
after a long lag. Moreover, not many were transported to the once densely populated   17
highlands where the indigenous population losses were greatest, but rather to the sugar-
rich tropics where the losses were smallest. The demographic collapse destroyed 
indigenous political and institutional structures, facilitated religious and cultural 
assimilation, and helped raise the per capita income of the indigenous survivors who 
resettled on the best lands.
11  
It is useful to elaborate that last point: the demographic disaster in Latin America 
must have contributed to higher (but unknown) GDP per capita and average labor 
productivity, higher marginal productivity of labor, and lower marginal productivity of 
land, suggesting that the wage-rental ratio (w/r) went up and that inequality went down. 
The economics can be made a little more precise. Assume that only land (R) and labor 
(L) mattered in the early colonial economy, and that technology (A) was unchanged 
across the 16
th century. If we also assume constant returns to scale, then it follows that  
Y = AR
αL
β, α + β = 1,  
Y/L =  A(R/L)
α = y = GDP per capita. 
The marginal product of labor and land are, respectively, 
  d Y / d L   =   β(Y/L) = w, dY/dR = α (Y/R) = r 
so that the wage-rental ratio is 
  w / r   =   ( β/α)(R/L) 
Thus, the wage-rental ratio rises with the land-labor ratio, and the elasticity relating the 
two is (under these assumptions) always 1.  
                                                 
11 Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson (2007: 919-20). Note the demographic parallel with Alwyn Young’s 
argument that today’s HIV-AIDS raises the incomes of those Africans who survive the disease (Young 
2005), or Joel Mokyr’s argument that the Irish famine in the late 1840s raised per capita income of the 
survivors (Mokyr 1983).    18
The elasticity of GDP per capita to the land-labor ratio is α. Table 4 reports that 
population density fell by 51 percent between 1500 and 1600 (from 1.60 to 0.78 persons 
per square kilometer), implying that the land-labor ratio rose about 103 percent (from 
0.63 to 1.28 square kilometers per person). If α = 0.5, then GDP per capita might have 
increased by about 52 percent over the century. John Coatsworth (2008: 548) is in 
agreement: “As European disease and abuse decimated indigenous populations … per 
capita output rose ... Additional gains in productivity occurred when those who survived 
found work, resettled or were ‘congregated’ on the most productive lands.” And what 
went up, then went down. As the indigenous population slowly recovered between 1600 
and 1700, the land-labor ratio fell about 29 percent, implying that GDP per capita might 
have decreased by almost 15 percent, at least in the Latin American interior. Based on 
Mexican evidence, Coatsworth (2008: 548) thinks the fall was even bigger: “Mexican 
production stagnated for most of the seventeenth century, falling by half in per capita 
terms as population recovered … The revival of the indigenous population … put an end 
to rising productivity in agriculture.” Of course, things were different in the sugar-based 
plantation islands of the Caribbean, but these crude estimates generated by land-labor 
ratio trends are used in Table 4 to interpolate GDP per capita between Maddison’s 
observations for 1500 and 1790.  
According to the simple economics above, the percentage rise in the wage-rental 
ratio across the 16
th century would have been about the same as the percentage fall in the 
labor-land ratio.
12 If population fell by Livi-Bacci’s 90 percent estimate (from an index of 
                                                 
12 The economics is very simple, and complexity would diminish the size of the demographic disaster 
effects estimated here, but not the direction. For example, if land supply was very elastic (as it probably 
was in the Americas) then the impact on the land-labor ratio would be diminished. To take another 
example, while the assumption of constant technology across the 16
th century is analytically convenient,   19
100 to 10), then the land-labor ratio rose by a factor of ten (from an index of 10 to 100),
13 
which implies that wage-rental ratio rose by a factor of 10 as well. As we noted above, 
and based instead on Maddison’s population estimates, Table 4 implies that the land-
labor ratio rose by more than 100 percent. We have assumed perfect competition in these 
calculations which, of course, is completely inconsistent with our knowledge that Iberian 
colonists introduced coercive and repressive devices so that labor’s greater scarcity was 
not fully rewarded. In more formal terms, the Iberians used slavery, haciendas and other 
institutions to push the wage below labor’s marginal product (Coatsworth 2008; Bértola 
et al. 2009: 6-8). Thus, the demographically-induced rise in the wage-rental ratio must 
have been considerably less than 100 percent. But even if it was only 25 or 50 percent, it 
implies pronounced downward pressure on inequality across the 16
th century. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that land concentration also diminished as labor got scarcer, 
so there are other reasons to believe that exogenous demographic trends put strong 
downward pressure on inequality across the 16
th century. On the other hand, improved 
productivity in extracting minerals from the mines as well as any general improvement in 
economy-wide productivity (e.g. a rise in A) might have pushed inequality in the 
opposite direction, upwards. What was the net effect? Table 4 predicts that after the 
initial effect of colonization, there was very little additional change in Latin American 
inequality up to 1600. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
technological transfer from Europe and mining development must have increased A in the formal output 
and output per worker expression in the text. This point is expanded below.  
13 The cultivatable land area of Latin America was 10.966 million km
2 between 1500 and 1800. Livi-
Bacci’s 50 million pre-conquest population implies a population density of 4.56. His 3-4 (say 3.5) million 
estimate for c1700 implies a density of 0.31, a spectacular fall of population density over the 16
th century.   20
Inequality Rise: What Did Latin American Inequality Look Like in 1790? 
  Over the two centuries between 1600 and 1790, a number of fundamentals were at 
work in Latin America which would have served to raise inequality and extraction ratios. 
First and foremost, populations partially recovered their 16
th century losses. Interpolating 
1790 from Maddison’s (2008) estimates for 1700 and 1820, yields a rise in population 
from 8.6 million in 1600 to 12.45 million in 1790. Thus, population density rose from 
about 0.78 to 1.14, and land-labor ratios fell by about 31 percent. Second, GDP per capita 
rose from 438 to 650, or almost by half, and urbanization rose from 9 to 14.2 percent, or 
by more than half. These forces imply that the Gini might have risen from 36.2 to 57.6, 
which, according to the Table 4 predictions, implies that over the three centuries between 
1491 and 1870 Latin American inequality reached its peak in the late colonial decades 
just prior to independence. 
 
Revolution, Independence and Lost Decades 
  While revolution, independence and the ‘lost decades’ that followed up to about 
1870 (Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson 2007) were very complicated times, and while 
there must have been many forces at work influencing inequality, the ancient inequality 
regression predicts that the Gini probably dropped from 57.6 in 1790 to 46.4 in 1870. The 
biggest force contributing to the fall was, of course, independence and de-colonization 
since the five ‘lost decades’ between the 1820s and the 1870 yielded very little GDP per 
capita growth
14 or urbanization. Mexico repeats the Latin American (predicted) trends, its 
                                                 
14 Debate over Angus Maddison’s data is intense, but some adopt his more positive view of Latin American 
growth 1820-1870. See, for example, Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2007, 2009). However, even Prados’ 
more rosy view of post-independence is consistent with very poor growth performance (Prados 2007: Table   21
Gini falling from 57.7 to 44 between 1790 and 1870, and, once again, by far the biggest 
fall being between 1790 and 1820, from 57.7 to 47.8.  Ongoing research by Amilcar 
Challu also suggests a significant fall in Mexican inequality: he estimates a social table 
for 1844 Querétaro yielding a Gini of 51.3,
15 suggesting that most of the fall between 
1790 and 1870 had taken place by the 1840s.  
Recent archival work by Leticia Arroyo Abad (2008: Figure 1) confirms this 
prediction of falling inequality after independence. She uses data on wage rates and land 
rents to infer trends in inequality. When her rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela are weighted by 1850 populations, the resulting Latin American rent-wage 
ratio falls by 11 percent 1820-1850, and for Mexico alone the fall is 12 percent. 
Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad Mexican rent-wage ratio trends and the Mexican Gini 
coefficients coming from the social tables in Table 4 are closely reproduced by the 
Amilcar Challu rent-wage series for central Mexico 1780-1869 reported in Table 5. 
Challu’s inequality index rises by 38 percent from the 1780s to the 1800s, falls by 29 
percent from the 1800s to the 1820s, and then continues a slow downward drift during the 
‘lost decades’ up to the 1860s. To summarize, the Arroyo Abad index falls by 4 percent 
per decade between 1820 and 1850, the Challu index falls by 5.2 percent per decade 
between 1820 and 1869, and our Gini in Table 4 falls by almost 2 percent per decade 
between 1820 and 1870. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1.4): between 1820 and 1850, the two biggest republics, Brazil and Mexico, grew at 0 and 0.1 percent per 
annum, respectively; in the 1850s, the figures were -0.1 and -1.3. Lost decades indeed. 
15 In personal correspondence, Challu has described Querétaro as quite representative, but it is, of course, 
only one state.    22
Creating Modern Inequality during the Belle Époque Globalization Boom 
“[As] export-led economic growth took off throughout Latin America in the late 
nineteenth century, economic inequality increased … The returns to [land,] scarce 
capital and skills rose precipitously. Peasant and public lands … passed into the 
hands of landlords, politicians, land companies and plantations ... The conditions 
that Engerman-Sokoloff and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson saw as blocking 
economic growth were in fact the conditions that made it possible” (Coatsworth 
2008: 567-8). 
  The economics underlying Coatsworth’s statement above is, of course, quite 
straight forward. Latin America faced a rising terms of trade throughout the late 19
th 
century. Since it was a primary product exporter, land and mineral rents were driven up 
relative to wages. This happened everywhere around the poor periphery (Williamson 
2002, 2008), but it was especially dramatic in Latin America partly because the region 
was able to expand its export sectors so effectively, thus to become very large shares in 
GDP (Williamson 2009: Table 4.1). Since land and mineral resources were held by those 
at the top, inequality rose as well. Not too long ago, the only data we had to judge the 
magnitude of these inequality trends were proxies, like the land rent to unskilled wage 
ratio or the GDP per worker to unskilled wage ratio (Williamson 1999, 2002). Thus, 
when the rent-wage ratios for Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (Arroyo Abad 
2008: Figure 1) are weighted by 1890 populations, the Latin American average rises 7.9 
percent per decade 1850-1870 and 6.3 percent per decade 1870-1900, for a total increase 
of 37 percent after 1850. This rent-wage proxy thus implies a big inequality surge over 
the second half of the century. We also have the more comprehensive belle époque   23
inequality evidence for the Southern Cone summarized in Table 6. It comes from two 
sources: first, Ginis calculated from new evidence collected by Luis Bértola and his 
collaborators (2009: Table 4), and second, what Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2007: 
Table 12.1) calls his backward projected Pseudo-Ginis. They both tell the same tale: 
inequality rose by 11-37 percent over the belle époque. True, and as the table makes 
clear, the Latin American weighted average reported in Table 6 refers only to four 
republics in the Southern Cone – Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Thus, the 
average misses the heavily populated Mexican and Andean republics. However, Prados 
de la Escosura also shows that a Mexican inequality proxy -- income per worker to the 
unskilled wage ratio -- rose by about 2.8 times between the early 1880s and 1920 (Prados 
de la Escosura 2007: Figure 12.1b), suggesting that over its four Porfiriato pre-
revolutionary decades Mexico followed the Southern Cone by recording a steep rise in 
inequality. Brazil recorded a less spectacular increase between the early 1880s and the 
mid 1920s, but still the income per capita to unskilled wage ratio rose by about 45 
percent (Prados de la Escosura 2007: Figure 12.1b). Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad rent-
wage inequality proxy for Mexico confirms the Prados data since the 1870-1900 increase 
was 27 percent over the three decades. Assuming, therefore, that Mexican inequality rose 
more like the Prados P-Ginis than the Bértola Ginis for the southern cone, it follows that 
Latin American inequality probably rose by something like 30 percent over the belle 
époque. Applying that increase to the 1870 Latin American Gini coefficient in Table 4 
would imply that it rose from 46.4 to 60.3, making the Gini in the 1920s the highest that 
Latin America recorded since pre-conquest, even higher than the 1790 colonial peak 
(57.6), and much, much higher than 1600 (36.2). Any modern analyst who believes that   24





Figure 3 plots our inequality predictions from 1491 to 1929. However crude the 
evidence may seem, it points to several revisionist interpretations of, or hypotheses about, 
500 years of Latin American inequality.  
First, it is simply not true that Latin America has always been unequal. It cannot 
be stressed enough that this is a comparative statement. Only by comparisons with other 
times and places can statements about Latin American inequality offer any useful 
meaning. While comparisons with the United States are not uncommon in the recent 
literature, comparisons with the European (colonial) leaders or with other parts of the 
poor periphery are rarely, if ever, made. When such comparisons are made (Table 3 and 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2008), income inequality in pre-industrial Latin 
America is found to have been lower than that of northwest Europe, not higher. To 
repeat, it is not true that pre-industrial Latin America (pre-1870) was more unequal than 
pre-industrial northwest Europe (pre-1800). Thus, if, as Engerman and Sokoloff have 
suggested, it is thought that inequality encouraged rent-seeking, suppressed private 
property rights, retarded the development of ‘good’ institutions, and thus discouraged 
growth in Latin America, it must have done even more so in northwest Europe where the 
industrial revolution first started! In addition, it appears that pre-conquest Latin America 
had one of the lowest, if not the lowest, level of inequality anywhere in the poor   25
periphery. It also appears that Latin American inequality remained one of the lowest 
anywhere around the world until the start of the seventeenth century. It can hardly be said 
that initial endowments and Iberian colonization made Latin America more unequal than 
other places. 
Second, Latin America was poorer than northwest Europe, and poorer societies 
have smaller surpluses for the elite to extract. Thus, while inequality was lower, what this 
paper and Milanovic et al. (2008) call extraction rates (how much of the available 
surplus was actually extracted by the elite) were considerably higher in Latin America 
than in northwest Europe. Whether measured inequality or extraction rates are the best 
indicators of pro-rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions is an issue that needs to be 
resolved since they offer very different inferences regarding Latin American growth 
underachievement. Presumably, political inequality had an important influence on the 
size of the extraction ratio. 
Third, Latin American inequality over the five centuries from pre-conquest to the 
present has exhibited immense variance: indeed, Latin America exhibited more inequality 
variance between 1491 and 1929 (Ginis ranging from 22.5 to 60.3) than one can find 
across Latin America today (Ginis ranging from 42 for Trinidad and Tobago to 60 for 
Bolivia: López and Perry 2008: Figure 1, Panel A), or than one can between Latin 
America, Europe, and East Asia today (51, 34, 38, respectively: López and Perry 2008: 2-
3). While the historical literature certainly offers strong opinions about potential 
explanations, we need far more evidence to document them firmly. By replacing less 
rapacious indigenous elite with more rapacious European elite, the Iberian conquest 
appears to have raised, initially, inequality by about half. Yet, the sixteenth century saw   26
very little further rise in inequality, most probably because the demographic disaster 
produced a powerful downward offset to all other inequality-increasing forces. It looks 
like the two centuries up to about 1790 or so saw the biggest increase in Latin American 
inequality, reaching its colonial peak in that year (Gini 57.6: Table 4). What are the 
explanations for the colonial inequality boom? Was it simply driven by increases in GDP 
per capita and thus in the surplus available for the elite to extract? Or, did the elite learn 
more effective ways to extract a bigger share of the same surplus? Or was it both? In any 
case, about half of that huge rise up to 1790 was eroded by three decades of war and 
independence, followed by five post-independence ‘lost decades’ of economic stagnation. 
Thus, by 1870 inequality in Latin America (Gini 46.4: Table 4) was not much different 
than it was for all pre-industrial societies for which we can get the data (Gini 44.3: Table 
1).  To repeat, while inequality was high in Latin America as it was poised for its 
industrial revolution, it was no higher than the average pre-industrial society, nor higher 
than industrializing Europe. 
Fourth, globalization forces during the belle époque pushed Latin American 
inequality up to historic highs by the 1920s. Although that belle époque inequality boom 
cannot yet be adequately measured for all of Latin America, it looks like ongoing 
research will shortly do so (e.g Bértola et al. 2009). Other primary product exporters 
underwent similar inequality-enhancing booms over that half century too (Williamson 
2002; 2006), but it appears that Latin America had one of the biggest inequality booms, 
and, even more notable, that the high inequality achieved persisted (and even increased) 
during the anti-global episode between the 1920s and the 1970s (Prados 2007: Table 
12.1). The latter offers a striking contrast with the industrialized world which underwent   27
a great egalitarian leveling across the mid-20
th century (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 
53-62; Goldin and Margo 1992; Atkinson and Piketty 2008).   
The inequality history that makes Latin America distinctive stretches across the 
20
th century when Europe and its English-speaking offshoots underwent a secular decline 
in inequality correlated with the rise of the welfare state (Lindert 2004; Atkinson and 
Piketty 2008). Latin America did not share that 20
th century decline. Why has 20
th 
century Latin American inequality history been so unique, while everything else about 
their inequality history from 1491 to the 1920s was so ordinary?  
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Table 1 Pre-Industrial Inequality Measures 
 








ratio (in %) 
Roman Empire 14    39.4    2.1  52.6  75.0 
Byzantium 1000    41.1    1.8  43.7  94.1 
England & Wales 1290    36.7    2.1  53.0  69.2 
Tuscany  1427    46.1    3.3  69.3  66.6 
South Serbia 1455    20.9    1.5  32.2  64.8 
Holland  1561    56.0    3.8  73.4  76.3 
Levant 1596    39.8    3.2  69.1  57.6 
England & Wales 1688    45.0    4.7  78.8  57.1 
Holland 1732    61.1    6.8  85.2  71.7 
Moghul India 1750    48.9    1.8  43.4  112.8 
Old Castille 1752    52.5    2.5  59.7  88.0 
Eng1and & Wales 1759    45.9    5.9  82.9  55.4 
France 1788    55.9    3.8  73.5  76.1 
Nueva España 1790    63.5    2.5  60.2  105.5 
England & Wales 1801    51.5    6.7  85.0  60.6 
Bihar (India) 1807    33.5    1.8  43.7  76.7 
Netherlands 1808    57.0    6.0  83.3  68.5 
Naples 1811    28.4    2.2  52.9  53.7 
Chile1861   63.7    4.3  76.8  83.0 
Brazil 1872    43.3    2.4  58.3  74.2 
Peru 1876    42.2    2.2  54.0  78.1 
Java 1880    39.7    2.2  54.6  72.8 
China 1880    24.5    1.8  44.4  55.2 
Japan 1886    39.5    3.1  67.2  58.8 
Kenya 1914    33.2    1.5  34.2  96.8 
Java 1924    32.1    3.0  66.9  48.0 
Kenya 1927    46.2    1.9  46.2  100.0 
Siam 1929    48.5    2.6  62.1  78.1 
British India 1947    49.7    2.1  51.3  96.8 
Average    44.3   3.1  60.6  74.9 
Modern counterparts             
Italy 2000    35.9    62.5  98.3  36.5 
Turkey  2003    43.6   22.0  95.4  45.7 
United Kingdom 1999    37.4   66.1  98.4  38.0 
Serbia 2003    32.2    11.2  91.0  35.4 
Netherlands 1999    28.1    72.0  98.5  28.5 
India 2004    32.6    6.4  84.2  38.7 
Spain 2000    33.0    50.9  97.9  33.7 
France 2000    31.2    69.4  98.4  31.7 
Mexico 2000    53.8    24.1  95.7  56.2 
Chile 2003    54.6    33.7  96.6  56.4 
Brazil 2002    58.8    13.9  92.7  63.4 
Peru 2002    52.0    12.3  91.8  56.7 
Kenya 1998    44.4    4.5  77.6  57.2 
Indonesia 2002    34.3    10.7  90.5  37.9 
China 2001    41.6    11.5  91.2  45.6 
Japan 2002    26.0    70.2  98.5  26.4 
Thailand  2002    50.9    21.3  95.2  53.5 
Average   40.6    33.1  93.6  43.6 
Other contemporary                35








ratio (in %) 
countries 
South Africa 2000    57.3    14.7  93.1  61.6 
United States 2000    39.9    77.7  98.6  40.5 
Sweden 2000    27.3   52.2  98.0  27.9 
Germany 2000    30.3    62.0  98.3  30.8 
Nigeria 2003    42.1    3.0  66.7  63.1 
Congo, D.R., 2004    41.0    1.5  33.3  123.1 
Tanzania 2000    34.6    1.8  44.4  77.9 
Malaysia 2001    47.9    26.0  96.1  49.9 
Source: Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008: Table 2). Ancient societies ranked by year. 





Table 2 Regression Results for the Gini Coefficient 
  1 2  3 
GDP per capita  360.5***  366.7***  360.2*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita squared  -25.0***  -25.5***  -25.0*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Urbanization rate   0.349*  0.354*  0.353* 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.093) 
Population density  -0.105***  -0.100***  -0.107* 
 (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.053) 
Number of groups  -0.009  -0.009  -0.010 
 (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
Colony (0-1)  12.63***  12.93***  12.41*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Foreigner (0-1)  -9.59  -9.97  -9.26 
 (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.29) 
Asia (0-1)    -1.28   
   (0.69)   
Tax survey (0-1)  -4.86  -4.85  -4.85 
 (0.57)  (0.24)  (0.28) 
Constant -1246***  -1266***  -1245*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Number observations  28  28  26 
Adjusted R squared  0.75  0.73  0.73 
      
Notes: GDP per capita is in natural logs. Coefficients significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level denoted by 
respectively three, two and one asterisks, p values between brackets. 
Source: Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2008: Table 3). 
    




                             Table 3 Inequality in Pre-Industrial Latin America and Western Europe Compared 
                
    Country 
 
Year            Source of 
 
Population Urbanization Ratio Peasant 
Actual 
Gini 








Gini      Ratio 
                
Brazil 1872  occupational  census  10,167 16.2  0.67  43.3  58.3  0.743 
Chile 1861  occupational  census  1,702  29  0.28  63.7  76.8  0.829 
Nueva España  1790  social tables  4,500 9.1  0.24 63.5  60.5  1.052 
Peru   1856  social tables  2,469  15    35.5  54.0  0.657 
Latin America      18,838           
  Unweighted 
average       17.3  0.40  51.5  62.4  0.825 
  Weighted average        15.5  0.51  48.9  59.9  0.816 
                
England 1688  social  tables  5,700 13  0.21  45.0  78.8  0.571 
England 1759  social  tables  6,463 16  0.37  45.9  82.9  0.554 
England 1801  social  tables  9,053 30  0.34  51.5  85.0  0.606 
France 1788  social  tables 27,970  12  0.27  55.9  73.5  0.761 
Holland 1561 
tax census dwelling 
rents 983  45    56.0  73.4  0.766 
Holland 1732 
tax census dwelling 
rents 2,023  39    61.1  85.2  0.717 
Western Europe      52,192           
  Unweighted 
average       25.8  0.30  52.6  79.8  0.659 
  Weighted average        17.4  0.29  52.9  77.7  0.681 
                





Table 4  Data used for the Gini Predictions and the Ginis 
            
  GDP Urbanization  Colony Density  Gini  Coefficients 
  per capita  Rate (%)  Dummy (person/km2)  Actual  Predicted
 
(1990 
US$)         
            
Latin America            
1491 416  11.0  0  1.60    22.5
1492 416  11.0  1  1.60    35.1
1600 438 9.0 1  0.78    36.2
1700 530  12.5  1  1.10    48.5
1790 650  14.2  1  1.14    57.6
1820 691  13.9  0  1.97    47.0
1870 676  15.0  0  3.68    46.4
            
Mexico    1790  710 9.1 1  4.96  63.5  57.7
1820 759  8.9  0  5.38    47.8
1844 718  9.2  0  6.41  51  46.1
1870 674  9.6  0  7.41    44.0
            
Brazil      1872  721 16.2 0 1.20  43.3  48.9
            
Chile       1861  1083 29.0 0  2.23 63.7  72.3
            
Peru       1876  653 15.0 0 1.92  42.2  45.4
            
Sources and Notes:           
GDP per capita: Maddison (2008), except Peru 1876 from Milanovic, Lindert and  
Williamson (2008: Table 1). For Latin America, Mexico and Brazil, 1790 is linearly interpolated  
between 1700 and 1820. For Chile1790, the Mexican growth rate 1790-1820 is assumed. 
Population: Maddison (2008). Missing years linearly interpolated.   
Urbanization: Bairoch (pp. 388-9, 423) and Sánchez-Albornoz (1974: pp. 30-32, 77). Latin  
American 1820 interpolated. Mexico 1820 and 1870 derived by assuming percent fall 1790-
1820  
and rise 1820-1870 the same as for Latin America.        
Land area: Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008: Table 1).    
Colony dummy: While Chile gained independence in 1818, the other did so shortly after 1820:  
Brazil 1822, Mexico 1821, Peru 1821, and a few even later. Yet, the colony dummy is still set  
equal to 0 in 1820 for Latin America and all four regions in the table.      
Actual Gini: Tables 1 and 3.        
Predicted Gini: Data above inserted in to estimated regression, col. 1, Table 2. 
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Sources: Land rents are constructed from data taken from personal correspondence from 
Amilcar Challu, who collected the central Mexican hacienda data from secondary sources. Land 








Table 6.  Southern Cone Inequality Trends 1870-1920s 
                   
  Argentina Brazil  Chile  Uruguay    Latin  America 
  Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini   Gini P-Gini 
               
1870  52.2 39.1 53.4 32.9 59.4 41.3 48.1 29.6   53.7 34.8 
1920s  57.4 49.3 59.7 47.2 64.1 49.2 56.2 36.6   59.6 47.5 
                   
% change  10.0  26.1  11.8  43.5  7.9 19.1  16.8  23.6    11.0  36.5 
                   
Sources: Ginis for 1870 and 1920 from Bértola et al. (2009: Table 4). Pseudo-Ginis for 1870 and 1929, from 
Prados (2007: Table 12.1).                   
Notes: The Latin America weighted Gini averages use 1900 population as weights. The P-Gini is a Pseudo-Gini 












Figure 1  Ancient Inequalities: Estimated Gini Coefficients,  
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Note: The solid line IPF is constructed on the assumption that s=$PPP 300. See text. 
Source: Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008: Figure 2).    41
Figure 2 
Inequality Extraction Ratio for the Ancient  
















































1000 2000 5000 10000 20000
gdp per capita in 1990 ppp
 
Note: Modern societies are drawn with hollow circles. Horizontal axis in logs. Inequality extraction ratio 
shown in percentages. 
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